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INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that, especially in thé last five years, there isno légal issue that has gathered more interest in thé interna-
tional légal community of Canada than that of thé national appli-
cation of international law.1 It would certainly not be wrong to
trace this enthusiasm back to thé 1999 décision of thé Suprême
Court of Canada in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
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1
 This issue is also very much alive in other common law countries, such as Aus-
tralia, Gréât Britain, and New Zealand. See S.A. Riesenfeld and F.M. Abbott
(eds.), Parliamentary Participation in thé Making and Opération ofTreaties — A Com-
parative Study (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994); S. Donaghue, "Balancing
Sovereignty and International Law: The Domestic Impact of International Law in
Australia" (1995) 17 Adelaide L. Rev. 213; A. Mason, "The Influence of Inter-
national and Transnational Law on Australian Municipal Law" (1996) 7 Public
L. Rev. 20; B. Conforti and F. Francioni (eds.), EnforcingInternational Human
Rights in Domestic Courts (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997); K. Keith, "The
Application of International Human Rights Law in New Zealand" (1997) 32
Texas Int'l LJ. 401; K. Keith, "The Impact of International Law on New Zealand
Law" (1998) 6 Waikato L. Rev. i; M. Gobbi, "Drafting Techniques for Imple-
menting Treaties in New Zealand" (2000) 21 Statute L. Rev. 71; and B.R.
Openkin, "Constitutional Modelling: The Domestic Effect of International Law in
Commonwealth Countries — Part I" (2000) Public L. 607. For an général assess-
ment of thé situation in some countries on thé European continent, see B. Con-
forti, "Notes on thé Relationship between International Law and National Law"
(2001) 3 Int'l L. Forum 18.
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Immigration),2 where thé majority has been interprétée! as open-
ing thé door to thé use of international treaties unimplemented in
thé domestic légal System.3 It might be more accurate, however, to
speak of thé domestic use of international law not really as a new
issue4 but rather as a "sexy" issue in thé contemporary légal lit-
erature of thé so-called globalized world order.
Karen Knop, for instance, examines Baker and opines that it
shows that thé Suprême Court of Canada is moving away from thé
traditional model of international law in domestic courts.5 Devel-
oping on Anne-Marie Slaughter's model of transgovernmentalism6
2
 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817
[hereinafter Baker].
3
 See, among others, H.M. Kindred, "Canadians as Citizens of thé International
Community: Asserting Unimplemented Treaty Rights in thé Courts," in S.G.
Coughlan and D. Russell (eds.), Citizenship and Citizen Participation in thé Adminis-
tration of Justice (Montréal: Thémis, 2002), 263 at 284, who wrote that thé "judge-
ment in Baker v. Canada has carried Canadian courts into new territory" and that,
indeed, thé "rôle of unimplemented treaties is [now] better defined."
4
 Indeed, pre-dating Baker, thé Canadian Council on International Law [here-
inafter CCIL] organized in 1998 a congress on thé topic. See CCIL, The Impact of
International Law on thé Practice ofLaw in Canada — Proceedings ofthe 2 jth Annual
Conférence of thé Canadian Council on International Law, Ottawa, October 15-17, icjcjS
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999). Going back further to 1996, one
may recall that former Justice Gérard La Forest, in "The Expanding Rôle of
thé Suprême Court of Canada in International Law Issues" (1996) 34 Canadian
Y.B. Int'l L. 89, at 100, famously wrote that Canadian courts "are truly becoming
international courts" and that, already in his 1988 paper, "The Use of Interna-
tional and Foreign Material in thé Suprême Court of Canada," in CCIL, Proceed-
ings of thé icj88 Conférence of thé Canadian Council on International Law (Ottawa:
CCIL, 1988), 230 at 230, thé Suprême Court of Canada was one ofthe most "cos-
mopolitan of national courts" in regard to thé foreign material upon which it
relied. Even in thé 19705, Ronald St.J. Macdonald wrote an influential pièce enti-
tled "The Relationship between International Law and Domestic Law in Canada,"
in R. St.J. Macdonald, G. Morris, and D.M.Johnston (eds.), Canadian Perspectives
on International Law and Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1974), 88, in which he examined thé doctrine of incorporation in Canada as well
as thé domestic status of both conventional law and customary law.
5
 See K. Knop, "Hère and There: International Law in Domestic Courts" (2000) 32
New York U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 501.
6
 See A.-M. Slaughter, "Governing thé Global Economy through Government
Networks," in M. Byers (éd.), The Rôle ofLaw in International Politics —Essays in
International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), 177; and A.-M. Slaughter, "A Typology of Transjudicial Communication"
( 1994) 29 U. Richmond L. Rev. 99.
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and Patrick Glenn's comparative law methodology,7 she argues in
favour of a new approach based on thé persuasive value of inter-
national law. Stephen Toope, for his part, rejects this suggestion
of a mère influential rôle for international norms and argues that
we are, in fact, living in a time of changing metaphors, away from
national sovereignty and towards transnationalism — "in this in-
between time, international law is both 'foreign' and 'part of us.'"8
Toope develops his thoughts further and writes that "international
law is both outside and in."9 Indeed, he argues that "international
law is partly our law," which means that thé "process of relating
international law to domestic law is not a translation of norms from
outside."10
One of thé main characteristics of thé discourse about thé
domestic use of international law in Canada is that thé scholarship
is written by internationalists and is expressed within thé interna-
tional légal framework11 — and, arguably, with thé underlying
objective of promoting thé rôle of international law in thé coun-
try's judicial decision-making process. The fact that international
lawyers participate most actively in thé debate is not at ail néga-
tive — this is not thé point. It is rather thé lack of serious and sub-
stantive doctrinal inputfrom thé point of view of thé domestic légal
7
 See P. Glenn, "Persuasive Authority" (1987) 32 McGill LJ. 261.
8
 SJ. Toope, "The Uses of Metaphor: International Law and thé Suprême Court of
Canada" (2001) 80 Canadian Bar Rev. 534 at 540. Later, he wrote: "The
Suprême Court's telling of thé story of international law in Canada will dépend
upon old and new metaphors, thé old metaphor of binding law and thé new
metaphor of persuasive authority. Both metaphors must be employed, but not
usually at thé same time or in thé same way." Ibid., at 541.
9
 SJ. Toope, "Inside and Out: The Stories of International Law and Domestic
Law" (2001) 50 U. New Brunswick LJ. 11 at 11. See also J. Brunnée and SJ.
Toope, "A Hésitant Embrace: The Application of International Law by Cana-
dian Courts," in National Judicial Institute, FederalCourt of Canada Education Sem-
inar: Domestic Impact of International Instruments (conférence held in Ottawa on
January 31, 2003) [paper on file with author].
10
 Ibid.,at 18 [emphasis in original].
11
 For instance, consider thé following excerpt from Brunnée and Toope's paper
delivered at thé Fédéral Court seminar, where they admit taking thé "standpoint
of international law" and speak of thé "bindingness of international law." They
write: "From thé standpoint of international law, then, thé Baker décision puts into
thé spotlight two questions about thé bindingness of international law. How should
courts approach international treaty norms that are binding on Canada, but,
absent implementation, not directly applicable in Canada? How should they
approach norms that do not bind Canada internationally but that nonetheless
reflect important international values" (supra note 9 at 45) [emphasis added].
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System, in particular, from thé statutory interprétation perspective
that perhaps ought to be of concern.
Indeed, thé two most authoritative works on législative interpré-
tation — Driedger on thé Construction of Statutes^ by Ruth Sullivan
and Interprétation des lois13 by Pierre-André Côté — give a compara-
tively small place to this increasingly important feature of today's
approach to thé construction of statutes.14 Sullivan's latest édition
of Construction of Statutes has noticeably included a separate chap-
ter on thé rôle of international law in législative interprétation,15
which examines some questions in more détail (presumptions
of compliance implementing législation) but leaves others unad-
dressed, such as thé différent status of treaties and customs, judicial
notice of such law, thé effect of jus cogens norms, and thé persuasive
force of thé argument based on international law. On thé other
hand, a consultation of a few Canadian textbooks and casebooks in
international law — for example, Public International Law16 by John
Currie and International Law11 by Hugh Kindred et al. — shows
how thé national application of international law is considered
atlength.18
The purpose of this article is to bring a new and différent per-
spective to thé debate over thé domestic use of international law —
12
 R. Sullivan, Driedger on thé Construction of Statutes, 3rd éd. (Toronto and Vancou-
ver: Butterworths, 1994).
13
 P.-A. Côté, Interprétation des lois, ycà. éd. (Montréal: Thémis, 1999).
14
 In thé third édition of Construction of Statutes (supra note 12), Sullivan had three-
and-a-half pages on thé "Compliance with International Law" in thé chapter
entitled "Presumption of Législative Intent" (ibid., at 33033), as well as eight
pages on thé use of international conventions as "extrinsic aids" (at 459-66). In
thé third édition of Côté (supra note 13), international law occupied two-and-a-
half pages in a sub-section on norms of a higher level, which are considered as
contextual éléments of législative interprétation; ibid., at 466-68.
15
 R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on thé Construction of Statutes, 4th éd. (Markham,
Ontario and Vancouver: Butterworths, 2002). Chapter 16, entitled "Interna-
tional Law" has twenty pages, three headings, and twelve sub-headings.
16
 J. Currie, Public International Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).
17
 H.M. Kindred étal, (eds.), International Law — Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in
Canada, 6th éd. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2000).
18
 Both Currie and Kindred et al, supranote 16 and 17 respectively, hâve a separate
chapter on thé domestic use of international law, of twenty-five pages and eighty
pages respectively. Among other important questions, they discuss thé interac-
tion of international law and national law, thé dualist and monist théories of
international law réception, thé différent status of conventional law and custom-
ary law, and thé conflicts berween international law and domestic statutory law.
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one that speaks within thé discourse of Canadian internai law and
that focuses on thé method of législative interprétation. The argu-
ment put forward is that thé national application of international
law is, as far as Canadian judges and other domestic actors are
concerned, a question of statutory interprétation, which must be
addressed, rationalized, and understood within that framework.
Of course, an exhaustive examination of this issue would look at
both conventional norms and customary norms — thé two princi-
pal sources of international law.19 The présent study, however, is
more modest in ambition and, thus, more limited in scope. It con-
centrâtes on thé domestic use of treaties in Canada, leaving thé
difficult issue of customary international law for another day. The
article begins with a preliminary matter on which is founded thé
main proposition — thé claim that international law "binds"
Canada. The hypothesis identified also requires a considération of
thé practices of treaty implementation in Canada. Building upon
thé contextual argument of statutory interprétation, an analytical
scheme is then put forward to détermine thé persuasive force of
international law, which is based on thé degree of incorporation
of treaty norms within thé Canadian légal System.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CANADIAN JUDGES
It seems that a large part of thé polemic among international law
scholars revolves around thé issue of whether or not "international
law" is binding within Canada.20 The traditional stance that inter-
national law is not binding was most clearly reiterated by thé
Suprême Court of Canada in Ordon Estatev. Grail,21 in thé context of
thé interprétation of a statutory provision prescribing a limitation
period for maritime négligence claims. In applying thé so-called
presumption of conformity with international law, Justices Frank
lacobucci and John Major, for thé court, wrote that "[ajlthough
international law is not binding upon Parliament or thé provincial
législatures, a court must présume that législation is intended to
comply with Canada's obligations under international instruments
19
 Statute of thé International Court of Justice, aôjune 1945, U.N.T.S. 961, Can.
T.S. 1945 No. 7 (entered into force on 24 October 1945), at Article 38, enunci-
ates thé sources of international law [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
20
 See, for instance, G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), at 4.
21
 Ordon Estatev. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437.
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and as a member of thé international community."22 In an article
co-authored with Gloria Chao, Justice Louis LeBel reminds us
that "international law is generally non-binding or without effective
control mechanisms" and thus warns that domestically "it does
not suffice to simply state that international law requires a certain
outcome."23
However, this traditional position has recently been challenged,
presumably following thé groundbreaking décision in Baker and, it
seems, as a resuit of thé suggestion by Karen Knop that, because
international law is indeed not binding, thé comparative law meth-
odology ought to be useful in conceptualizing thé national applica-
tion of international law.24 Indeed, Knop writes that thé relevance
of international law "is not based on bindingness," which means
that "thé status of international and foreign law becomes similar,
both being external sources of law."25 In fact, Knop challenges thé
binding/non-binding distinction — what she calls thé "on/off
switches for thé domestic application of international law"26 — and
suggests an alternative approach, which she argues springs from
thé Baker case, "where thé authority of international law is persua-
sive rather than binding."27
This proposition seemed to "rub"28 thé wrong way some interna-
tional légal commentators in Canada. One of them is Stephen
Toope who, in promoting a more direct rôle for international law
in Canada, opines that "thé dichotomy that Knop sets up between a
22
 Ibid., at 526 [emphasis added].
23
 L. LeBel and G. Chao, "The Rise of International Law in Canadian Consti-
tutional Litigation: Fugue or Fusion? Récent Developments and Challenges
in Internalizing International Law" (2002) 16 Suprême Court L. Rev. (2nd) 23
atÔ2.
24
 This proposition has prompted stark, and somehow cavalier, criticism from
some authors. See, for instance, G. van Ert, supra note 20, at 35: "In my view,
Knop's équation of international law with foreign law is simply unsupported by
thé weight of Anglo-Canadian authority. The rule of judicial notice described
above — and much else in this work besides — directly réfutes this approach.
Knop's mistake is to assume that international law is not binding, and to dérive
from that assumption thé further view that thé relevance of international law in
Canada is not based on its bindingness. But international law is binding."
25
 Knop, supranote 5, at 520 [emphasis added].
26
 Ibid., at 515.
27
 Ibid., at 535.
28
 "Rub" is indeed thé word Toope himself used in describing thé effect that Knop's
paper had on him — see Toope, supra note 8, at 535.
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traditional focus on international law as 'binding' on domestic
courts, and international law as 'persuasive authority' is, I think,
a false dichotomy."29 Instead, he argues that "international law can
be both"30 binding and persuasive because "international law is
both 'foreign' and 'part of us.'"31 In another article, Toope further
argues that "international law is not merely a story of 'persuasive'
foreign law. International law also speaks directly to Canadian law
and requires it to be shaped in certain directions. International
law is more than 'comparative law,' because international law is
partly owrlaw."32 Again, in his présentation withjutta Brunnée for a
Fédéral Court seminar, he opined:
Our worry is that thé majority décision [in Baker] places thé Suprême
Court on a path towards treating ail international law as persuasive
authority, which thé Court mayuse to 'inform' its interprétation of domes-
tic law. In other words, by treating both binding and non-binding interna-
tional norms in this manner, courts move away from their duty to strive for
an interprétation that is consistent with Canada's international obliga-
tions. Thus, as appealing as [Knop's] comparative law metaphor may seem
at first glance, it too bears risks.
In their final analysis, Brunnée and Toope forcefully conclude that
"many international légal rules bind Canada: some are part of
Canadian law. They should be treated accordingly."34
Whether or not one is in agreement with Knop's comparative
law metaphor with respect to ail international law norms, strictly
speaking, international law does not bind Canada (that is, bind






 Ibid., at 540.
32
 Toope, supra note g, at 18 [emphasis added].
33
 Toope and Brunnée, supra note g, at 46 [emphasis in original].
34
 Ibid., at 66 [footnotes omitted].
35
 It is useful to distinguish between, on thé one hand, international law as a set of
rules regulating thé relations between states and, on thé other, international law
as a set of rules that can hâve an impact on domestic law that governs people.
The former is what could be referred to as "international international law" and
thé latter "domestic international law. " Justice Louis LeBel and Gloria Chao
called thé former "principles of public international law qua binding law," as
opposed to "their application in thé domestic légal order." See LeBel and Chao,
supra note 23 at 62. On thé binding character of international law on sovereign
states, see generally I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th éd.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, iggo), at 1-2.
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fundamental reason behind this lack of obligatory légal force relates
to thé so-called Westphalian model of international relations, which
very much remains at thé centre of thé présent state System and,
hence, thé présent international law System.
TENETS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM
Although some international law scholars hâve suggested that
"national sovereignty" is a dying metaphor36 — perhaps not dis-
similarly to thé globalizationist claim of thé imminent "end of thé
nation state"37 or even thé triumphantalist claim of thé "end of his-
tory"38 — thé matrix in which international affairs are conducted
and in which international law opérâtes remains based on thé West-
phalian model of international relations, at thé centre of which is
thé "idée-force"^ of state sovereignty.40 As Richard Falk explains, it
is "by way of thé Peace of Westphalia that ended thé Thirty Years'
War, that thé modem System of states was formally established as
thé dominant world order framework."41 Similarly, Mark Janis writes
that "[sjovereignty, as a concept, formed thé cornerstone of thé
36
 See Toope, supra note 8, at 540: "To construct thé 'foreign,' one must accept thé
continuing influence of thé dying metaphor of national sovereignty" [emphasis
added].
37
 See K. Ohmae, The End of thé Nation State— The Rise of Régional Economies (New
York and London: Free Press, 1996) andJ.-M. Guehenno, The End ofthe Nation-
State (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), at 108.
38
 See F. Fukuyama, The End of History and thé Last Mon (New York: Free Press,
1992). The "end of history" thesis holds that thé end of thé Cold War constitutes
compelling évidence that a Worldwide consensus has emerged in favour of capi-
talism and libéral democracy. For a critique of this argument, see J. Derrida,
Specters ofMarx — The State oftheDebt, thé Work ofMourning, and thé New Interna-
tional (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), 5&ff- For an interesting paral-
lel between Fukuyama's claim and some international law scholarship, see
S. Marks, "The End of History? — Reflections on Some International Légal
Thèses" (1997) 8 EuropeanJ. Int'l L. 449.
39
 That is, "idea-force." See A. Fouillée, L'évolutionnisme des idées-forces (Paris: Félix
Alcan, i89o),atXI.
40
 See, generally, S. Beaulac, "The Westphalian Légal Orthodoxy — Myth or Real-
ity?" (2000) 2j. HistoryInt'IL. 148.
41
 R.A. Falk, Law in an Emerging Global Village: A Post-Westphalian Perspective
(Ardsley, US: Transnational Publishers, 1998), at 4 [emphasis added]. See also
R. Redslob, Histoire des grands principes du droit des gens —Depuis l'antiquitéjusqu 'à
la veille de la grande guerre (Paris: Rousseau, 1923), at 213: "Avec le traité de West-
phalie commence une nouvelle époque dans l'histoire du droit des gens" [foot-
notes omitted].
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édifice of international relations that 1648 raised up. Sovereignty
was thé crucial élément in thé peace treaties of Westphalia."42
The international reality consists of a community of sovereign
states — sometimes called thé society of nations — which are in-
dependent from one another and hâve their own wills and finalities
as corporate-like représentatives of thé peoples living in their ter-
ritories. The eighteenth-century author Emer de Vattel proposed
an international légal framework to regulate thé relations between
states in his masterpiece Le Droit des Gens; ou Principes de la loi
naturelle appliqués à la conduite & aux affaires des Nations & des Sou-
verains.4^ His séminal contribution is a scheme in which sovereign
states are thé sole actors on thé international plane and thus thé
only subjects of international law.44 It is also based on thé formai
equality of states and on a notion of national independence that
involves non-interférence in thé domestic affairs of other states.45
This basic theory is still very much underlying modem interna-
tional law.46
Accordingly, thé Westphalian model of international relations,
which is governed by thé Vattelian légal structure, involves an in-
ternational realm that is distinct and separate from thé internai
42
 M.S. Janis, "Sovereignty and International Law: Hobbes and Grotius," in R. St. J.
Macdonald (éd.), Essays in Honour a/Wang Tieya (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1994), 391, at 393 [emphasis added]. Likewise, see also T.M. Franck, The
Empowered Self— Law and Society in thé Age of Individualism (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 5.
43
 E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens; ou Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite &
aux affaires des Nations & des Souverains, 2 vols. (London: n.b., 1758). See also thé
English translation by J. Chitty and E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles
of thé Law of Nature, Applied to thé Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns
(Philadelphia: Johnson Law Booksellers, 1863).
44
 On this point, in thé modem context of international law, see W.A. Schabas,
"Twenty-Five Years of Public International Law at thé Suprême Court of Canada"
(2000) 79 Canadian Bar Rev. 174, at 176.
45
 See S. Beaulac, "Emer de Vattel and thé Externalization of Sovereignty" (2003)
5J. History Int'l L. 237.
46
 See, generally, S. Beaulac, The Power of Language in thé Making of International
Law — The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and thé Myth ofWestphalia (Leiden
and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004). However, see P. Allott, "The Emerging
Universal Légal System" (2001) 3 Int'l L. Forum 12, at 17: "International social
reality has overtaken international social philosophy. The Vattelian mind-world
is withering away under thé impact of thé new international social reality.
The reconstruction of thé metaphysical basis of international law is now well
advanced. The deconstruction of thé false consciousness of politicians, public
officiais, and international lawyers is onlyjust beginning."
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realm.47 John Currie explains thus: "Public international law is
not so much an area or topic of thé law as it is an entire légal System,
quite distinct from thé national légal Systems that regulate daily life
within states."48 As far as thé relation between international law and
domestic law is concerned, there is no direct connection because
thé two Systems are distinct and separate49 — "public international
law exists outside and independent of national légal Systems."50
With respect to thé issue of thé national application of interna-
tional law, thèse international law/internal law distinct and sepa-
rate realms are no doubt behind thé following comments by LeBel
J. and Gloria Chao: "As thé heart of thé debate is thé tension
between thé démocratie principle underlying thé internai légal
order and thé search for conformity or consistency with a develop-
ing and uncertain external légal order."51 Appositely, Karen Knop
schematically writes that "domestic law is 'hère' and international
lawis 'there.'"52
This continuing and continuons distinct and separate reality of
our modem state System of international relations explains two
fundamental principles of international law. The first one is that,
on thé international plane, a state is not entitled to invoke its in-
ternai law — which includes its constitutional structure53 — in
47
 See S. Beaulac, "On thé Saying That International Law Binds Canadian Courts"
(2003) 29(3) CCIL Bulletin i. In fact, even thé most forceful advocates of an
increased rôle of international law in Canada acknowledge that "public interna-
tional law is not a subset of thé internai laws of states, but a separate légal System in
its own rights." See van Ert, supra note 20, at 15 [emphasis added].
48
 Currie, supra note 16, at i [emphasis added].
49
 It follows that thé assertion that thé législative power of a sovereign state like
Canada is compétent to "violate" international law is a meaningless statement
based on a flawed question that wrongly assume some kind of inhérent connec-
tion between thé international plane and thé national level — see van Ert, supra
note 20, at 55^
50
 Currie, supra note 16, at i. Contra, see G. Palmer, "Human Rights and thé New
Zealand Government's Treaty Obligations" (1999) 29 Victoria U. Wellington L.
Rev. 27, at 59: "For many years international law and municipal law hâve been
seen as two separate circles that never intersect. Increasingly, however, thé way to
look at them, I suggest, is that they are two circles with a substantial degree of
overlap and indeed it can be argued that there is only one circle."
51
 LeBel and Chao, supra note 23, at 24 [emphasis added].
52
 Knop, supranote 5, at 504.
53
 See R.Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, gth éd., vol. i (Lon-
don: Longman, 1992), at 254: "Nevertheless, in principle a state which has
incurred international obligations cannot rely on its internai constitutional
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order to justify a breach of its international obligations.54 The
Suprême Court of Canada accepted this basic principle of interna-
tional law in Zingre v. The Queen,bb where Justice Robert Dickson
quoted and endorsed a statement by thé Canadian Department of
External Affairs stating that "it is a recognized principle of inter-
national customary law that a state may not invoke thé provisions
of its internai law as justification for its failure to perform its inter-
national obligations."56 Fundamentally, a state cannot rely on its
domestic law to justify a failure to honour its obligations vis-à-vis
thé international community because thèse norms and duties are
part of two distinct and separate légal Systems.
The second core principle of international law springing from
thé international/internai divide is thé need to administer thé
relationship between thé two Systems. John Currie refers to this
feature as thé "international-national law interface"57 and writes
that thé relationship "will dépend on légal rules that détermine, as
a matter of law, how one légal System treats another."58 As in other
Commonwealth countries,59 in Canada thé réception rules on how
international law is applicable in domestic law are a matter of con-
stitutional law. FrancisJacobs explains:
First, thé effect of international law generally, and of treaties in particular,
within thé légal order of a State will always dépend on a rule of domes-
tic law. The fundamental principle is that thé application of treaties is
arrangements as a justification for any failure to complywith those obligations.
In respect of treaties this can lead to fédéral states being unable to become par-
ties" [footnotes omitted].
54
 The basic authority for this proposition is thé arbitration décision in thé
Alabama daims case (United States/United Kingdom) (1872), Moore, Arbitra-
tions, i. 653. This rule was codified in section 27 of thé Vienna Convention on
thé Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), Can.
T.S. 1980 No. 37 (entered into force on 27january 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]. See also P. Daillier and A. Pellet (eds.), Nguyen QuocDinh —Droit
international public, 5th éd. (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurispru-
dence, 1994), at 272.
55








 See, for instance, thé Australian situation with thé Commonwealth of Australia
Constitutional Act, 63 & 64 Victoria, c. 12 (U.K.), and thé décision of thé Aus-
tralian High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnie Affairs v. Teoh (1995),
183 C.L.R. 273, at 286-87.
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governed by domestic constitutional law. It is true that domestic law may,
under certain conditions, require or permit thé application of treaties
which are binding on thé State, even if they hâve not been specifically
incorporated into domestic law. But this application of treaties "as such" is
prescribed by a rule of domestic constitutional law. It is not a situation
reached by thé application of a rule of international law, since such a rule,
to hâve effect, itself dépends upon récognition by domestic law. Indeed
international law is generally uninformative in this area since it simply requires thé
application of treaties in ail circumstances. It does not modify thefundamentalprin-
ciple that thé application of treaties by domestic courts is governed by domestic law.60
Thèse constitutional rules are unwritten61 — perhaps amounting
to constitutional conventions62 — and corne from thé British tra-
dition through thé preamble to thé Constitution Act, iSôy,63 which
provides that Canada shall hâve "a Constitution similar in princi-
ple to that of thé United Kingdom." As Peter Hogg has explained,
"Canada's constitutional law, derived in this respect from thé
United Kingdom, does not recognize a treary as part of thé internai
(or'municipal') law of Canada."64
Indeed, it has become an orthodoxy65 in Canada that an inter-
national treaty66 is not part of thé law of thé land until it has been
incorporated domestically, which must be accomplished "by thé
enactment of a statute which makes thé required change in thé
law."67 The basic authority for this proposition undoubtedly remains
60
 F.G. Jacobs, "Introduction," in F.G. Jacobs and S Roberts (eds.), The Effect of
Treaties in Domestic Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1987), xxiii, at xxiv
[emphasis added].
61
 As Chief Justice Antonio Lamer confirmed in Re Provincial CourtJudges, [1997] 3
S.C.R. 3, at 68, "thé général principle [is] that thé Constitution embraces unwrit-
ten, as well as written rules."
62
 Constitutional conventions were considered by thé Suprême Court of Canada in
Re Resolution to Amena thé Constitution, [1981] i S.C.R. 753. See also A. Heard,
Canadian Constitution Conventions: The Marriage of Law and Politics (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1991).
63
 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
Appendix II, No. 5.
64
 RW. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd (student) éd. (Scarborough, ON:
Carswell, 1992), at 285.
65
 Stephen Toope referred to this principle as "trite law." See Toope, supra note 9,
at 12.
66
 It must be emphasized that thé présent article does not examine thé situation
with regard to customs.
67
 Hogg, supra note 64, at 285. The suggestion recently made that international
treaty norms could be implemented through non-législative means such as gov-
ernment policy measures, albeit virtuous (perhaps), is unsupported by authority
I
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thé décision of thé Judicial Committee of thé Privy Council in thé
notorious case Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for
Ontario (Labour Conventions case).68 The implementation require-
ment for treaties has been reiterated and applied at thé Suprême
Court of Canada69 —Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubé reaffirmed thé
rule in thé 1999 Bakerca.se: "International treaties and conventions
are not part of Canadian law unless they hâve been implemented by
statute."70 Again, in Sureshv. Canada (MinisterofCitizenship and Immi-
gration),71 in 2002, thé Suprême Court wrote: "International treaty
norms are not, strictly speaking, binding [sic] in Canada unless they
hâve been incorporated into Canadian law by enactment."72
INTERNATIONAL LAW IS NOT AND CANNOT BE "BINDING" IN CANADA
Going back to thé two distinct and separate realms of thé inter-
national and thé internai, it is understood of course that each of
thèse légal Systems has its own judiciary. At thé international level,
Article 92 of thé Charter of thé United Nations73 provides that
"[t]he International Court of Justice shall be thé principal judicial
organ of thé United Nations" — it was created with thé adoption
of thé Statute of thé International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) ,74
— see E. Brandon, "Does International Law Mean Anything in Canadian
Courts?" (2001 ) 11J. Environmental L. & Prac. 399, at 407: "Thus a treaty that
has been brought into Canadian law through other measures — such as policy —
should be of equal status to treaties implemented by spécifie législation."
68
 Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326, at 347
[hereinafter Labour Conventions].
69
 See, for instance, .Franmv. The Queen, [1956] 618, at 621; Capital Cities Commu-
nications Inc. v. Canada (C.R.T.C.), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, at 172-73 [hereinafter
Capital Cities]; Opération Dismantle Inc. v. R., [1985] i S.C.R. 441, at484-
70
 Baker, supra note 2 at 861.
71
 Sureshv. Canada (MinisterofCitizenship and Immigration), [2002] i S.C.R. 3 [here-
inafter Suresh]. See also S. Beaulac, "The Suresh Case and Unimplemented Treaty
Norms" (2002) 15 Rev. québécoise d. int'l 221.
72
 Suresh, supra note 71 at 38.
73
 Charter of thé United Nations, June 26, 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7 (entered
into force on 24 October 1945); not published in thé U.N.T.S.
74
 ICJ Statute, supra note 19. Its predecessor was thé Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice of thé League of Nations, created pursuant to Article 415 of thé
Treaty of Versailles, concluded on 28 June 1919 — see thé English text of thé
treaty in C. Parry (éd.), Consolidated Treaty Séries, vol. 225 (Dobbs Ferry, US:
Oceana Publications, 1969), at 189. There has been a prolifération of courts
and tribunals at thé international level, especially in thé past fifteen years, with
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At thé national level, to take Canada as an example, there exists
a whole judicial structure of domestic courts and tribunals,75 both
provincial and fédéral, at thé pinnacle of which is thé Suprême
Court of Canada, established pursuant to section i o i of thé Con-
stitution Act, iSôy76 and created in 1875 (along with thé ancestor
of thé Fédéral Court) with thé adoption of thé Suprême and Exche-
quer Courts Act, 1875.77
The more important point is that both sets of courts hâve their
own sets of légal norms — that is, thé ICJ and thé other interna-
tional courts and tribunals apply international law and thé
Suprême Court of Canada and thé other Canadian courts and tri-
bunals (or any domestic courts of sovereign states) apply their
domestic law.78 This assertion may sound trite, but, in thé présent
debate over thé issue of thé internai use of international law, some
truisms might need to be recalled from time to time.79 Of course, it
does not mean that international judicial bodies cannot take into
considération domestic law, which is in fact an explicit source of
international law under Article 38(1) of thé ICJ Statute80 or that
over a dozen international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies established. See
C. Brown, "The Prolifération of International Courts and Tribunals: Finding
Your Way through thé Maze" (2002) 3 Melbourne J. Int'l L. 453, at 455-56.
75
 On thé Canadian judiciary, in général, see G.L. Gall, The Canadian Légal System,
4th éd. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1995), at 181^
76
 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 63.
77
 Suprême and Exchequer Courts Act, 1875, S.C. 1875, c. 11. Now, it is thé
Suprême Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 8-26, which provides for thé Suprême Court
of Canada.
78
 For thé saké of completeness, it must be added that, of course, Canadian private
international law can dictate that foreign domestic law will apply to a particular
situation. This does not change thé basic proposition, however, because Cana-
dian courts fundamentally resort, even in such cases, to Canadian domestic law
in thé first instance.
79
 For instance, see thé following statement that appears to run in thé face of thé
général tenets of international law: "The tendency to look to explicitly interna-
tional forums, such as thé International Court of Justice, for thé exclusive
enforcement of international law is a mistake. International jurisdiction is not
confined to internationally constituted courts in thé way that jurisdiction over
Japan is reserved to Japanese courts. Rather, international and domestic courts
share jurisdiction. Indeed, to distinguish between international and domestic courts is
afalse dichotomy." Van Ert, supra note 20, at 5 [emphasis added].
80
 ICJ Statute, supra note 19. Sub-paragraph b of Article 38(1) provides, as a
source of international law, "thé général principles of law recognized by civilized
nations." On général principles of law, see M. Shaw, International Law, 4th éd.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), at 77^
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domestic case law does not influence their décisions as a secondary
source of international law81 and even as évidence of international
customs.82 Conversely, Bill Schabas rightly points out that Cana-
dian judicial organs may use "international law to thé extent that it
is also part of thé 'Laws of Canada.'"83
The mutual influence, however, does not modify thé basic situa-
tion that thé international judiciary applies thé légal norms of its
realm and that national judiciaries apply thé légal norms of their
realms. The international reality is distinct and separate from thé
internai reality and, consequently, thé actualization of interna-
tional law through judicial decision-making is distinct and separate
from thé actualization of domestic law through judicial decision-
making. Although this aspect is not usually dwelled upon in judicial
décisions, thé Suprême Court of Canada has had such an opportu-
nity to consider its rôle vis-à-vis thé international légal System in
Référence re Sécession of Québec.84 The amicus curiae argued that thé
court had no jurisdiction to answer questions of "'pure' interna-
tional law."85 The response, which is significant for thé présent pur-
poses, was that thé "Court would not, in providing an advisory
opinion in thé context of a référence, be purporting to 'act as' or
substitute itself for an international tribunal."86 Thus, as LeBelJ.
and Gloria Chao observe, "thé key limits to thé [Suprême] Court's
use [of thèse norms] is that it has never seen itself as a final arbiter
of international law."87
The acknowledgment that thé international légal reality is dis-
tinct and separate from thé national légal reality, including with
81
 Sub-paragraph c of Article 38(1) of thé ICJ Statute provides that judicial déci-
sions, including those of domestic courts, are a subsidiary source of interna-
tional law. It may be going too far, however, to argue that, through its décisions,
"thé Suprême Court of Canada not only applies and interprets public interna-
tional law, it may also create if — see W.A. Schabas, supra note 44, at 176 [empha-
sis added].
82
 See Brunnée and Toope, supra note g, at 7, where thé authors appositely wrote:
"Especially in thé context of customary international law, domestic courts par-
ticipate in thé continuons weaving of thé fabric of international law." See also
A.E. Roberts, "Traditional and Modem Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation" (2001) 95 American J. Int'l L. 757.
83
 Schabas, supra note 44, at 176.
84
 Référence re Sécession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
85




 LeBel and Chao, supra note 23, at 59.
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respect to their judicial instances, does not mean that thé former
may not hâve any effect on thé latter.88 In Référence re Sécession of
Québec,89 an argument was also made that thé court had no jurisdic-
tion to "look at international law"90 in order to décide thé questions
at issue. "This concern is groundless" was thé reply: "In a number of
previous cases, it has been necessary for this Court to look to inter-
national law to détermine thé rights or obligations of some actor
within thé Canadian légal System."91 Therefore, treaty norms of
thé distinct and separate international légal System may hâve an
effect within thé Canadian domestic légal System.92 It is important
to acknowledge, however, that such a légal effect will not at ail be
automatic or obligatory. Rather, because thé two légal Systems exist
independently, thé impact that one can hâve on thé other will be
decided by thé latter System — that is, by thé légal rules of réception
already explained earlier in this article with respect to interna-
tional treaties.
Put another way, domestic courts (such as Canadian courts)
interpret and apply domestic law (such as Canadian law), and it is
to thé extent that thé constitutional and other domestic légal rules
allow international law to be part of domestic law — and that it has
in effect become part of that domestic law — that international
treaty norms may hâve an impact on thé interprétation and appli-
cation of domestic law by domestic courts. In this sensé, interna-
tional law qua international law can never "bind" a sovereign state
such as Canada, or, more accurately, international law can never be
stricto sensu "binding" within thé Canadian légal System because
Canadian domestic courts hâve jurisdiction over Canadian law, not
international law.93 What international law can do, and, indeed,
should do as much as possible, is to "influence" thé interprétation
and application of domestic law — thé degree of which will dépend,
88
 The position defended hère is thus reconcilable with La Forest J.'s comments
(supra note 4, at 100-1 ) about thé internationalization of our courts.
89
 Référence re Sécession of Québec, supra note 84.
90




 The Suprême Court of Canada referred to thé Référence re Powers to Levy Rates on
Foreign Légations and High Commissioners'Résidences, [1943] S.C.R. 208; Référence
re Ownership of Offshore Minéral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] S.C.R. 792; and
Référence re Newfoundland Continental Shelf, [1984] i S.C.R. 86.
93
 See S. Beaulac, "Arrêtons de dire que les tribunaux au Canada sont 'liés' par le
droit international" (2004) 38 Rev.jur. Thémis, forthcoming.
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in thé words of Schabas, on thé extent that international law "is also
part of thé 'Laws of Canada.'"94
The "influence" of international law on thé interprétation and
application of Canadian law can also be put in terms of thé déter-
mination of thé "persuasive force" of international law or thé
évaluation of thé "weight" of thé international law argument. This
approach to thé domestic use of international law is not an en-
dorsement of thé proposition put forward by Karen Knop based on
thé transgovernmental model and thé comparative law methodol-
ogy.95 The approach shares, however, thé belief that international
law, by définition, cannot "bind" thé courts of sovereign states. The
reason suggested in this article why international law can only
be "influential" or "persuasive" is différent from Knop's and boils
down to thé two distinct and separate realities of international law
and national law. Canadian courts interpret and apply Canadian
law and, with respect to treaties, in order to know what influence
thé written norms of international law found in them can hâve on
thé written norms of Canadian domestic law found in statutes, it
is now appropriate to bring thé debate within thé discourse of lég-
islative interprétation.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A CONTEXTUAL ELEMENT OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The argument at thé heart of this article is that thé use of interna-
tional law is, as far as Canadian judges and other domestic actors are
concerned, a question of statutory interprétation, which must be
addressed, rationalized, and understood within this framework. This
hypothesis now requires an examination of thé général discourse of
statutory interprétation and, in particular, thé contextual argument,
which is considered in some détail. Only then can thé main proposai
be properly explained, namely, thé analytical scheme to décide thé
persuasive force of international law, which considers thé matter in
which treaties were implemented and is thus based on thé degree of
incorporation of treaty norms within thé Canadian légal System.
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES
The implementation of treaties is required to bridge thé inter-
national and thé national distinct and separate realms and to give
94 Schabas, supra note 44, at 176.
95 See Knop, supra note 5.
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légal effect to such international norms at thé domestic level.96 It
will be argued that thé manner in which treaty norms are incorpo-
rated within thé Canadian légal System by thé compétent législative
authority should détermine thé persuasive force of thé international
law argument of contextual interprétation of domestic statutes.
Accordingly, it is first necessary to examine in some détail thé dif-
férent législative practices that are followed to Amplement interna-
tional conventions.
Ruth Sullivan identifies two techniques used by législative
authorities to give légal effect to international treaty law in Canada:
( i ) incorporation by référence and (2) harmonization.97 The first
technique directly implements thé treaty, either by reproducing
its provisions in thé statute itself or by including thé text as a sched-
ule and somehow indicating that it is thus part of thé statute.98
"When a législature implements an international convention
through harmonization," on thé other hand, "it redrafts thé law to
be implemented in its own ternis so as to adapt it to domestic law."99
96
 For thé same of completeness, one must mention that it is thé very large majority
of international treaties that require législative implementation, but not in any
way ail of them — see Hogg, supra note 64, at 285: "Many treaties do not require
a change in thé internai law of thé states which are parties. This is true of treat-
ies which do not impinge on individual rights, nor contravene existing laws,
nor require action outside thé executive powers of thé government which made
thé treaty. For example, treaties between Canada and other states relating to
defence, foreign aid, thé high seas, thé air, research, weather stations, diplo-
matie relations and many other matter, may be able to be implemented simply by
thé executive action of thé Canadian government which made thé treaty" [foot-
notes omitted]. Moreover, treaties relating to war and peace as well as treaties
pertaining to territory transfers do not require implementation through législa-
tion. See Brownlie, supra note 35, at 48; and R. St. J. Macdonald, "International
Treaty Law and thé Domestic Law of Canada" (1975) 2 Dalhousie LJ. 307 at
308-10 and 313-14.
97
 See Sullivan, supranote 15, at 430.
98
 Indeed, it has become clear with thé majority reasons of lacobucci J. in Re Act
Respecting thé Vancouver Island Railway, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 41, that scheduling an
international treaty is not sufficient to directly incorporating it domestically.
Using two opinions expressed in Ottawa Electric Railway Co. v. Corporation of thé
City of Ottawa, [1945] S.C.R. 105, lacobucci J. wrote: "Although divided in thé
resuit, I discern a common thread in théjudgments of Rinfret CJ. and KerwinJ.,
namely, that statutory ratification and confirmation of a scheduled agreement,
standing alone, is generally insufficient reason to conclude that such an agree-
ment constitutes a part of thé statute itself" (at 109). See also Winnipegv. Winnipeg
Electric Railway Co., [1921] 2 W.W.R. 282 (ManitobaCA.), 31306.
99
 Sullivan, supranote 15, 31434.
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Following this classification, one must realize that thèse practices
are not mutually exclusive — that is, international norms in a treaty
can be implemented not only by using one or thé other technique
but also by using a combination of both, where part of thé treaty
would be directly incorporated in thé statute while another part
would be incorporated through harmonization. The fédéral Immi-
gration Act100 is such a pièce of hybrid législation that it both
directly implements and harmonizes Canadian law in view of thé
Convention Relating to thé Status of Refugees.101
Another challenge regarding thé implementation of treaties,
which is this time due to Canada's fédéral nature, is that thé
same treaty — thé subject matter of which falls within provincial
power — is not necessarily implemented thé same way across thé
country. Thomson v. Thomson102 is an illustration of such a situation,
where Justice Gérard La Forest identified thé various ways in which
thé provinces had implemented thé Hague Convention of thé Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction103 — ail of thé provin-
cial acts, with thé exception of Québec, directly implemented thé
convention by référence (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Saskatche-
wan, and Alberta incorporated thé exact scheme, while Manitoba,
Ontario, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfound-
land incorporated thé treaty along with other législative provi-
sions).104 As for Canada's civil law jurisdiction, it did not "adopt thé
intégral wording thereof," as L'Heureux-Dubé J. pointed out later
in W. (V.) v. S. (D.j,105 hence, implementing thé treaty through har-
monizing législation and, thus, "ensuring that thé new rules can be
applied effectively within thé institutional framework of domestic
law."106
100
 Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985,0.1-2.
101
 Convention Relating to thé Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 18g U.N.T.S. 150,
Can. T.S. 1969 No. 6 (entered into force on 22 April 1954).
102 Thomsonv. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, at 601-2 [hereinafter Thomson].
103
 Hague Convention of thé Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 25
October 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35 (entered into force on
i December 1983).
104
 See M. Bailey, "Canada's Implementation of thé 1980 Hague Convention on
thé Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction" (2000) 33 New York U. J.
Int'l L. & Pol. 17 at 17-19.
105
 W. (V.)v. S. (D.), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 108, at 133.
106
 Sullivan, supra note 15, at434-
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Parliamentary Intention and Implementation
Given thé formai requirement of having législation transform
international treaty norms within thé Canadian domestic légal sys-
tem,107 thé deciding factor in knowing whether or not such incor-
poration has occurred is thé "intention of Parliament." Relying
on lacobuccij.'s reasons in Re Act Respecting théVancouverIslandRail-
way,109' Justice J. François Lemieux at thé Fédéral Court in Pfizer
Inc. v. Canada109 explained that "whether an agreement is legislated
so as to become endowed with statutory force is a matter of dis-
coveringParliament's intention."110 Thus, when thé statute explicitly
déclares that a certain international convention has "force of law
in Canada,"111 thé implementing requirement is most likely ful-
filled.112 Although thé language that is used in thé act is important,
"ail of thé tools of statutory interprétation can be called in aid
to détermine whether incorporation is intended."113 The old view
that "courts should be able to say, on thé basis of thé expression of
thé législation, that it is implementing législation,"114 therefore,
appears to be obsolète.
Such an assessment of législative intention led thé Fédéral Court
to hold in Pfizer115 that thé whole of thé Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing thé World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)116
was not incorporated in Canada through thé World Trade Orga-
nization Agreement Implementation Act,117 which even scheduled
107  See Hogg, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
108
 Re Act Respecting thé Vancouver IslandRailway, supranote 98, at 110.
109
 Pfizer Inc. v. Canada, [1999] 4F.C. 441 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Pfizer].
110
 7foW.,at458 [emphasis added].
111
 For instance, see section 3 of thé United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Con-
vention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (2nd supp.); and section 3(1) of thé Foreign
Missions and International Organizations Act, S.C. 1991, c. 41.
112
 Such clear intention to implement, however, is not necessarily conclusive — see
Antonsenv. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 2 F.C. 272 (F.C.T.D.), 31305-6.
113  Re Act Respecting theVancouver IslandRailway, supranote 98, at 110. See also Crée
Régional Authority v. Canada (Fédéral Administrator), [1991] 3 F.C. (F.C.A.), at
546-47 and 551-52.
114  MacDonaldv. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, at 171, perChief Justice
Boris Laskin.
115  Pfizer, supranote 109.
116
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing thé World Trade Organization, 15 April
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
117
 World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1994, c. 47.
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thé relevant international documents. Justice Lemieux reached thé
following conclusion:
When Parliament said, in section 3 of thé WTO Agreement Implementa-
tion Act, that thé purpose of that Act was to implement thé Agreement,
Parliament was merely saying thé obvious; it was providing for thé imple-
mentation of thé WTO Agreement as contained in thé statute as a whole
including Part II dealing with spécifie statutory changes. When Parliament
said in section 8 of thé WTO Agreement Implementation Act that it was
approving thé WTO Agreement, Parliament did not incorporate thé WTO
Agreement into fédéral law. Indeed, it could not, because some aspects of
thé WTO Agreement could be only implemented by thé provinces under
their constitutional législative authority pursuant to section 92 of thé
Constitution Act, 1867... What Parliament did in approving thé Agreement
is to anchor thé Agreement as thé basis for its participation in thé World
Trade Organization, Canada's adhérence to WTO mechanisms such as
dispute settlement and thé basis for implementation where adaptation
through régulation or adjudication was required.118
In short, as in any case in thé détermination of thé intention of
Parliament, thé statute should be read as a whole, in light of thé
language used, thé objective pursued, and thé context, both immé-
diate and extended (including thé preamble), of thé enactment
under examination.119
Passive Incorporation Is Not Implementation
The next important aspect of thé implementation requirement
question is whether or not what some hâve called "passive incor-
poration"120 of treaties actually constitûtes thé transformation of
international norms within thé Canadian domestic légal System.121
Such passive incorporation could be said to hâve occurred where
thé fédéral government concludes and ratifies an international
agreement on thé basis of existing domestic law that already con-
forms with Canada's new international obligations. In thé con-
text of international human rights law, Irit Weiser has considered
thé issue and attempted to elucidate thé effect of such passive
118
 Pfizer, supranote 109, 31460.
119
 See R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] i S.C.R. 401 [hereinafter Crown
Zellerbach] ; and R. v. Hydro-Québec, [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 213.
120
 Also known as "incorporation by complacence."
121
 See J. Ebbesson, Compatibility of International and National Environ-mental Law
(London: Kluwer Law International, 1996), at 206.
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incorporation on statutory interprétation.122 In thé context of
international environmental law, Elizabeth Brandon writes that,
"[gjiven thé common government practice of assessing Canada's
législative framework prior to signing a treaty, significance can be
attached to législative inaction by thé government following sig-
nature."123 She opines that "such inaction signais that thé existing
législative or policy framework has been deemed adéquate to fulfil
thé treaty obligations."124 Similarly, Jutta Brunnée and Stephen
Toope argue that, "[i] n cases where there was no spécifie législative
transformation but Canadian law is in conformity with a treaty
due to prior statutory, common law, or even administrative policy,
we suggest that thé treaty is also implemented for thé purposes of
domestic law."125
The contention that passive incorporation actually constitutes
thé domestic transformation of international treaty norms can be
attractive given thé claim that thé fédéral government has made on
occasion in its reports to international treaty bodies that Canada's
human rights commitments, for instance, hâve been met on thé
basis of prior conformity.126 This contention would be an error,
however, especially in view of thé three rationales — séparation of
powers, federalism, democracy — that underlie thé implementa-
tion requirement of international treaties. First, it would allow
thé executive branch of government to détermine, in effect, thé
légal effect of international treaty law within thé domestic realm of
Canada in blatant violation of thé séparation of powers in our par-
liament system of government. Second, it would be thé fédéral
government, which is deemed to hâve sole treaty-making power and
122
 See I. Weiser, "Effect in Domestic Law of International Human Rights Treaties
Ratifiée! without Implementing Législation," in CCIL, Thelmpact of International
Law on thé Practice ofLaw in Canada — Proceedings ofthe 2jth Annual Conférence
of thé Canadian Council on International Law, Ottawa, October 15-17, 1998 (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 132, at 137-39.
123




 Brunnée and Toope, supra note g, at 29.
126
 See, for instance, Canada's report to thé United Nations Human Rights Com-
mittee, sitting under thé first Optional Protocol to thé International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,6 I.L.M.
368 (1967), Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47 (entered into force on 23 March 1976) —
Human Rights Committee, Considération of Reports Submitted by States under Arti-
cle 40 ofthe Covenant: Fourth Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 1995: Canada,
U.N. C.C.P.R.O.R., 1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/io3/Add.5.
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international personality, that could indirectly transform treaties
in Canada through such passive incorporation, with no apparent
restriction in regard to thé constitutional division of législative
authority. Third, allowing for thé incorporation of treaty norms
without thé participation of thé elected assembly of thé compétent
government would create a real démocratie déficit, which, in a way,
would see thé international légal realm, in which citizens hâve no
participation, dictate thé democratically legitimate national légal
realm.127
Thèse may hâve been some of thé considérations that thé
Ontario Court of Appeal had in mind when considering thé argu-
ment based on thé International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights128 in Ahani v. Canada (Attorney General).129 The question at
issu e was whethe r thé Optional Protocol130 to th is convention wa s
part of thé laws of thé land. The fact that there is no législation in
Canada transforming thèse human rights commitments, directly or
127
 Compare thèse arguments with thé following ones by Brunnée and Toope:
"Two considérations suggest that thé [passive incorporation] approach is both
correct and compatible with legitimate concerns over thé proper rôles of thé
executive, legislators, and thé judiciary. First, where a treaty does not actually
affect domestic law, thé concern that thé authority of Parliament or thé provin-
cial législature could be usurped by fédéral executive action seems misplaced.
In any event, it remains open to Parliament or provincial législatures to deviate
from treaty provisions through explicit statutory action. Second, where no lég-
islative action is required to bring domestic law in line with Canada's treaty
commitments, it seems absurd to insist on explicit statutory implementation.
This applies with even greater force when Canada, in international forums,
reports its implementation of treaty commitments, as it does regularly, for
example, in thé human rights context." Brunnée and Toope, supra note 9, at
30-31-
128
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 126.
129
 Ahaniv. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 107 [hereinafter Ahani].
The Ahani case was considered with thé Suresh case at thé Suprême Court of
Canada, thé décisions in which were handed down on 11 January 2002. Unlike
thé latter, thé petitioner Ahani was not given a new déportation hearing and,
having exhausted ail domestic remédies, he petitioned thé United Nations
Human Rights Committee under thé Optional Protocol to thé International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, supra note 126. The international
instance requested Canada to stay thé déportation until thé full considération
of Ahani's case, which was refused by thé fédéral government. The second
Canadian judicial proceeding, which reached thé Ontario Court of Appeal (thé
Suprême Court of Canada refused leave to appeal), was asking for an injunc-
tion to suspend his déportation order, which was refused.
130
 Optional Protocol, supra note 126. See, on pétitions under thé Optional Proto-
col in général, Schabas, supranote 44, at 193-95.
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through harmonization, is well documented in légal literature.131
Both thé majority and thé dissent reached thé inescapable conclu-
sion that thèse international norms hâve no légal effect within thé
Canadian domestic légal System: "Canada has never incorporated
either thé Covenant or thé Protocol into Canadian law by imple-
menting législation. Absent implementing législation, neither has
any légal effect in Canada."132 It would lead to an "untenable resuit,"
thé majority further wrote, to "convert a non-binding request, in a
Protocol which has never been part of Canadian law, into a binding
obligation enforceable in Canada by a Canadian court."133 Justice
Marc Rosenberg, in dissent, agreed with thé fédéral government
and, thus, thé majority of thé court on this point.134
This clear judicial pronouncement from thé authoritative
Ontario Court of Appeal will hopefully put to rest thé argument
that thé passive incorporation of a treaty constitutes thé transfor-
mation of international norms. Yet thé légal community of Canada,
and especially thé judiciary, ought to remain vigilant that thé basic
rule requiring domestic transformation of international conven-
tions through domestic législation not be furtively changed through
thé backdoor with this unsound doctrine.135
131
 See, for instance, Kindred, supra note 3, at 265: "Yet nowhere to date is there
législation explicitly implementing within Canada such fundamental interna-
tional human rights conventions as thé International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, thé International Covenant on Economie, Social and Cultural Rights
and thé Convention on thé Rights ofthe Child" [footnotes omitted]. This is thé gen-
erally accepted view in Canada, which contrasts with that expressed by van Ert,
supra note 20, at 186: "It is true that there is no such thing as thé ICCPR Imple-
mentation Act. To conclude from this, however, that Canadian law does not
implement thé ICCPR is, at best, an oversimplification and, at worst, simply
wrong."
132
 Ahani, supra note 129, at para. 31, per Laskin J.
133
 Ibid., atpara. 33.
134
 See Justice Rosenberg's reasons, ibid., at para. 73, which read as follows: "On
thé légal side, they [thé fédéral government et al] invoke thé established princi-
ple that international conventions are not binding in Canada unless they hâve
been specifically incorporated into Canadian law. The Covenant, while ratified,
has never been incorporated into Canadian domestic law and therefore does
not create légal obligations enforceable in Canada."
135
 See B.R. Openkin, "Constitutional Modelling: The Domestic Effect of Interna-
tional Law in Commonwealth Countries — Part II" (2001) Public L. 97, at 109,
who wrote: "A concern that judges should not be seen to be implementing
treaties by thé 'back door' has been expressed in other cases as well. It démon-
strates a judicial sensitivity to thé primacy of parliament and thé corresponding
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE CONTEXTUAL ARGUMENT
The différent ways in which international treaties can be trans-
formed in Canada through législation will inform thé proposed
analytical scheme. The premise hère is that international treaty law
must be considered in terms of persuasive force (as opposed to
being "binding") within thé Canadian domestic légal System — that
is, as being influential on thé interprétation and application of
législative norms. Therefore, thé most appropriate discourse to
address, rationalize, and understand thé national application of
international law is that of thé construction of statutes and, specifi-
cally, thé contextual argument.
If there is a consensus on anything at thé Suprême Court of
Canada (as well as in lower courts) it is that, when it cornes to statu-
tory interprétation, thé proper approach is that expressed by Elmer
Driedger in his second édition of his celebrated book Construction
of Statutes: "Today there is only one principle or approach, namely,
thé words of an act are to be read in their entire context in their
grammatical and ordinary sensé harmoniously with thé scheme
of thé Act, thé object of thé Act and thé intention of Parliament."136
It has now become known as thé "modem principle" of législa-
tive interprétation in Canada and, as lacobucci J. wrote in Bell
ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, it "has been repeatedly cited by
this Court as thé preferred approach to statutory interprétation across
a wide range of interpretive settings."137 Even in thé context of tax-
ation, thé principle applies, as Major J. pointed out in Will-Kare
Paving & Contracting Ltd. v. Canada: "The modem approach to
need for caution in superintending thé relationship between thé external and
internai légal order" [footnotes omitted]. See also R. Higgins, "The Relation-
ship between International and Régional Human Rights Norms and Domestic
Law" (1992) 18 Commonwealth L. Bulletin 1268, at 1274-75.
136
 E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd éd. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983),
at87-
137
 Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at 580 [emphasis
added]. lacobucci J. cited thé following cases: Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The
Queen, [1984] i S.C.R. 536, at 578; Québec (Communauté urbaine) v. Corp. Notre-
Dame de Bon-Secours, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 3, at i>j;Rizzo &RizzoShoesLtd. (Re), [1998]
i S.C.R. 27, at 40-41; R. v. Gladue, [1999] i S.C.R. 688, at 704; R. v. Araujo,
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, at 1006-7; R-v- Sharpe, [2001] i S.C.R. 45, at 74-75 [here-
inafter Sharpe] ; and Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2002] i S.C.R. 84, at 101-2.
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statutory interprétation has been applied by this Court to thé inter-
prétation of tax législation. "138
In R. v. UlybelEnterprises Ltd., lacobucci J. further opined that thé
"famous passage from Driedger 'best encapsulâtes' our court's pre-
ferred approach to statutory interprétation."139 Likewise, accord-
ing to Justice Charles Gonthier in Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian
Cable Télévision Assn.: "The starting point for statutory interpré-
tation in Canada is Driedger's définitive formulation."140 The mod-
em principle has recently been reformulated in R. v.Jarvis,141 where
lacobucci and Major JJ. paraphrased Driedger and wrote: "The
approach to statutory interprétation can be easily stated: one is to
seek thé intent of Parliament by reading thé words of thé provision
in context and according to their grammatical and ordinary sensé,
harmoniously with thé scheme and thé object of thé statute."142
Of course, this modem approach to thé construction of législa-
tion contrasts with thé old restrictive "plain meaning rule,"143 which
was adopted at a time when it was seriously believed that "Parliament
changes thé law for thé worse"144 and that a statute was an "alien
intruder in thé house of thé common law."145 The plain meaning
rule is now generally considered obsolète in common law jurisdic-
tions because courts realized that législative language cannot be
read in isolation:146 "The most fundamental objection to thé rule
is that it is based on a false premise, namely that words hâve plain,
138
 Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd. v. Canada, [2000] i S.C.R. 915, at 934.
Major J. cited thé following two cases: 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 804, at 810-11 and 832; and Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The
Queen, [1984] i S.C.R. 536, 31578.
139
 R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867, 31883.
140
 Barrie Public Utilities M. Canadian Cable Télévision Assn., [2003] i S.C.R. 476, at
para. 20.
141
 Rv.Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757.
142
 Ibid., at para. 77.
143
 On thé "plain meaning rule" (or "literal rule") in général, see P.-A. Côté, supra
note 13, at 357-86.
144
 F. Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1882 ), at 85.
145
 H. Stone, "The Common Law in thé United States" (1936) 50 Harvard L. Rev.
4,3115.
146 See, on this point, S. Beaulac, "Le Code civil commande-t-il une interprétation
distincte?" (1999) 22 Dalhousie LJ. 236, at 251-52; and S. Beaulac, "Parlia-
mentary Debates in Statutory Interprétation: A Question of Admissibility or of
Weight?" (1998) 43 McGillLJ. 287, 31310-12.
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ordinary meanings apart from their context."147 In England,148 thé
House of Lords acknowledged this shift in favour of a purposive
and contextual construction of législation in Pepperv. Hart,149 where
Lord Griffiths said:
The days hâve long passed when thé courts adopted a strict construction-
ist view of interprétation which required them to adopt thé literal meaning
of thé language. The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks
to give effect to thé true purpose of législation and are prepared to look at
much extraneous material that bears upon thé background against which
thé législation was enacted.150
British author Francis Bennion very recently reiterated thé danger
of thé plain meaning rule — what he called thé "first glance
approach": "The informed [that is, modem] interprétation rule is
to be applied no matter how plain thé statutory words may seem
at first glance."151 Bennion went further and argued that, "[wjithout
exception, statutory words require careful assessment of themselves
and their context if they are to be construed correctly."152
In Canada, L'Heureux-DubéJ. at thé Suprême Court of Canada
was one of thé main proponents of a libéral approach to thé inter-
prétation of statutes. Already in Hills v. Canada (Attorney General),153
for which she wrote thé majority décision in 1988, her views on
thé matter were well settled. Later in 2747-3/74 Québec Inc. v. Que-
bec (Régie des permis d'alcool),154 she wrote an impressive dissenting
opinion in which she made an exhaustive historical and doctrinal
147
 M. Zander, The Law-Making Process, 4th éd. (London: Butterworths, 1994), at
121.
148
 See A. Lester, "English Judges as Law Makers" (1993) Public L. 269, at 272,
who explains thé old English approach thus: "Yet they [courts] decided that,
to avoid 'making laws,' they were compelled to give efFect to thé 'plain and
unambiguous' language of a statute, no matter that words are rarely plain or
unambiguous in real life, and no matter how absurd might be thé resuit of such
a literal interprétation."
149




 F.A.R. Bennion, Statutory Interprétation — A Code, 401 éd. (London: Butter-
worths, 2002), at 500.
152
 Ibid. [emphasis added].
153
 Hillsv.Canada (Attorney General), [1988] i S.C.R. 513.
154
 2747-3774 Québec Inc. v. Québec (Régie des permis d'alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919
[hereinafter Régie des permis d'alcool}.
252 The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 2003
review of thé methodology of statu tory interprétation. Her conclu-
sion captured thé essence of thé modem approach:
What Bennion calls thé "informée! interprétation" approach is called thé
"modem interprétation rule" by Sullivan and "pragmatic dynamism"
by Eskridge. Ail thèse approaches reject thé former "plain meaning"
approach. In view of thé many ternis now being used to refer to thèse
approaches, I will hère use thé ter m "modéra approach" to designate a
synthesis of thé contextual approaches that reject thé "plain meaning"
approach. According to this "modem approach," considération must be
given at thé outset not only to thé words themselves but also, inter alla, to
thé context, thé statute's other provisions, provisions of other statutes
in pari materia and thé législative history in order to correctly identify thé
legislature's objective.155
She is obviously not alone anymore in openly holding that a proper
interprétation and application of a statute must consider thé con-
text and purpose as well as thé language of thé enactment. One
of thé latest examples is found in Harvard Collège v. Canada (Commis-
sionerof Patents),lb&where Justice Michel Bastarache, for thé major-
ity, wrote: "This Court bas on many occasions expressed thé view
that statutory interprétation cannot be based on thé wording of thé
législation alone."157
At thé outset of thé second édition of Construction of Statutes,
Elmer Driedger forcefully expresses thé view that in fact "[w]ords,
when read by themselves in thé abstract can hardly be said to hâve
meanings."158 In thé latest édition of Construction of Statutes, Ruth
Sullivan points out that "Driedger's modem principle is sometimes
referred to as thé words-in-total-context approach, a characterization
that is apt."159 Developing on thé idea that words need to be read in
context to identify their meanings,160 she writes:
155
 Ibïd., at 1002.
156
 Harvard Collèges. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45.
157
 Ibid., at para. 154. BastaracheJ. refered to thé opinion of lacobuccij. in Rizzo &
Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), supra note 137, at 41. In addition, to thé same effect, see thé
dissenting opinion by Bastarache and LeBelJJ. in Macdonellv. Québec (Commis-
sion d'accès à l'information), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 661, at 698, which reads: "[T]he
interprétation of an Act cannot be based simply on ils wording."
158
 Driedger, supra note 136, at 3 [emphasis in original].
159
 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 259 [emphasis added].
160
 See also R. Sullivan, "Some Implications of Plain Language Drafting" (2001)
22 Statute L. Rev. 145, at 147-49. The author wrote: "Virtually everyone who
studies language and communication agrées that, contrary to thèse assump-
tions, différent readers bring différent levels of compétence and différent con-
texts to their reading" (at 149) [footnotes omitted].
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The meaning of a word dépends on thé context in which it is used. This
basic principle of communication applies to ail texts, including législation.
It has been repeatedly confirmed by linguists, linguistic philosophers, cog-
nitive psychologists and others — by virtually anyone who studies commu-
nication through language. And it has long been recognized in law.161
A similar position, albeit more qualified, was taken by Pierre-André
Côté in Interprétation des fow.162 Randal Graham, using Derrida's
deconstruction,1633 opines likewise:
By far thé most important of thèse [interprétative] tools is often referred
to as "thé context." In ascertaining thé meaning of a word or a written pas-
sage, we appeal to thé context to guide our interprétation.164
In order to address, rationalize, and understand thé national
application of international law within thé framework of statutory
interprétation, treaties ought to be considered within this modem
approach — that is, within thé words-in-total-context approach. Ruth
Sullivan, who now has a who le chapter on international law,165
provides a list of contextual éléments that includes, significantly,
such norms:
Under Driedger's modem principle, thé words to be interpreted must
be looked at in their total context. This includes not only thé Act as a whole
and thé statute book as a whole but also thé légal context, consisting of
case law, common law and international law. The primary significance
161
 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 259. This proposition was again recently affirmed by
Bastarache and LebelJJ., dissenting, in Macdonellv. Québec (Commission d'accès à
l'information), supra note 157, at 698: "The plain meaning of thé words will not
be of much value if thé court considers it without regard to thé context of thé
statutory provision and thé purposes of thé Act."
162
 See Côté, supra note 13, at 355, where thé author wrote: "Sans aller jusqu'à pré-
tendre que les mots n'ont pas de sens en eux-mêmes, on doit admettre cepen-
dant que leur sens véritable dépend partiellement du context dans lequel ils
sont employés" [footnotes omitted]. A similar somewhat qualified position was
expressed by thé American author W.N. Eskridge Jr., "The New Textualism"
(1990) 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621, at 621: "The statute's text is thé most impor-
tant considération in statutory interprétation, and a clear text ought to be
given effect. Yet thé meaning of a text critically dépends upon its surrounding
context."
163
 The French author Jacques Derrida has developed his ideas on deconstruction
in several books, includingJ. Derrida, Positions (Paris: Minuit, 1972);^ Derrida,
Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Minuit, 1972) ; and J. Derrida, De la grammatologie
(Paris: Minuit, 1967).
164
 R.N. Graham, Statutory Interprétation — Theory and Practiœ (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 2001 ), at 62-63.
165
 See Sullivan, supra note 15^1421-39.
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of légal context is that it supplies a set of norms that affect interprétation
at every stage. Thèse norms influence thé intuitive process by which ordi-
nary meaning is established; they are also relied on in textual, purposive
and consequential analysis. Whether or not they are acknowledged, thèse
norms are part of thé mindset that lawyers andjudges unavoidably bring to
interprétation.166
This point is confirmed in thé international légal literature where,
for instance, Hugh Kindred writes that "where thé context of thé
législation includes a treaty of other international obligation, thé
statute should be interpreted in light of it."167The last section of
this article will develop this idea and suggest guidelines to assist in
determining thé interprétative value and weight of international
law as a contextual élément in thé construction of Canadian dômes-
tic statutes.
INTERNATIONAL TREATY NORMS AS CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS
OF INTERPRETATION
The argument defended throughout this article is that, funda-
mentally, thé national application of international law is a question
pertaining to thé construction of statutes. Indeed, thé législative
interprétation framework reflects that, far from being binding in
Canada, international treaty law can only be influential or persua-
sive within thé domestic légal System. Now, informed by thé treaty
implementation practices and in light of thé modem approach to
statutory interprétation, thé main contribution consists in propos-
ing an analytical scheme of thé persuasive force of international
law, which is based on thé degree of incorporation of treaty norms
within thé Canadian légal System. However, first, it is necessary to
briefly consider thé so-called presumption of conformity with inter-
national law and thé corrélative ambiguity requirement.
CONTEXT RATHER THAN PRESUMPTION AND AMBIGUITY
Given thé récent developments in regard to thé methodology
of statutory interprétation in Canada, especially with thé modem
principle that recognizes thé proper rôle of context and remem-
bering that it is more appropriate to consider international law as
166
 Ibid., at 262 [emphasis added]. See alsoj. Simard, "L'interprétation législative
au Canada : la théorie à l'épreuve de la pratique" (2001) 35 Rev. jur. Thémis
549, at 583 ^
167
 Kindred, supra note 3, at 271.
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an élément of persuasion rather than an all-or-nothing "binding"
factor, thé old way in which courts were able to resort to norms
from thé international légal order should be reformulated in a
more contemporary fashion.168 The relevant presumption of con-
formity — which is similar to those regarding thé conformity
with thé constitution or fundamental légal principles169 — is a rule
of interprétation according to which domestic statutes ought to
be read, whenever possible, consistently with international law.170
British author Peter Maxwell gives an early formulation of this rule
when he writes that "every statute is to be so interpreted and applied,
as far as its language admits, as not to be inconsistent with thé comity
of nations, or with thé established rules of international law."171 This
168
 This black-or-white approach to thé domestic use of international law is illus-
trated by thé décision of thejudicial Committee of thé Privy Council in Chung
Chi Cheungv. The Queen, [1939] A.C. 160, at 168, where Lord Atkin expressed
thé following view: "The Courts acknowledge thé existence of a body of rules
which nations accept amongst themselves. On any judicial issue they seek to
ascertain what thé relevant rule is, and, having found it, they will treat it as
incorporated into domestic law, so far as it is not inconsistent with rules enacted
by statutes or finally determined by their tribunals. " In Canada, see thé reasons
of Justice Andrew MacKay of thé Fédéral Court in José Perlera E. Hijos, S.A. v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1997] 2 F.C. 84, at 100 (F.C.T.D.), who wrote that
" [i] n construing domestic law, whether statutory or common law, thé courts will
seek to avoid construction or application that would conflict with thé accepted
principles of international law."
169
 See Côté, supra note 13, at 465: "L'interprète doit favoriser l'interprétation
d'un texte qui permet de le concilier avec les textes qui énoncent des règles de
niveau hiérarchique supérieur. On présume que le législateur n'entend pas
déroger à ces règles, qu'il s'agisse de règles du droit international ( i ), de règles
qui conditionnent la validité du texte (2) ou de règles énoncées dans certains
textes de nature fondamentale (3)."
170
 See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 421 : "Although international law is not binding
on Canadian législatures, it is presumed that thé législation enacted both feder-
ally and provincially is meant to comply with international law generally and
with Canada's international law obligations in particular." In international
légal literature, see also B.C. Vanek, "Is International Law Part of thé Law of
Canada?" (1960) 8 U. Toronto LJ. 251, at 259-60; Toope, supra note 8, at 538;
and H.M. Kindred, supra note 3, at 269-70.
171
 P.B. Maxwell, On thé Interprétation of Statutes (London: Sweet and Maxwell,
1896), at 122. See also, in England, Corocraftv. Pan American Airways, [1968] 3
W.L.R. 1273,311281 (C.A.), where Lord Denning wrote that there is a "dutyof
thèse courts to construe our législation so as to be in conformity with interna-
tional law and not in conflict with it." In international légal literature, see also
H. Lauterpacht, "Is International Law a Part of thé Law of England?" (1939)
Transactions Grotius Society 51.
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rule was enunciated clearly in Canada by Justice Louis-Philippe
Pigeon in Daniels v. White and The Queen:
I wish to add that, in my view, this is a case for thé application of thé rule of
construction that Parliament is not presumed to legislate in breach of a
treaty or in any manner inconsistent with thé comity of nations and thé
established rules of international law. It is a rule that is not often applied,
because if a statute is unambiguous, ils provisions must befollowed even ifthey are
contrary to international law.ï72
Very recently, thé Suprême Court of Canada again referred to this
presumption and, indeed, relied on this excerpt in Schreiberv. Canada
(Attorney General).173
When examined closely, this passage from Pigeon J.'s opinion
provides thé reason why thé presumption of conformity with inter-
national law does not any longer correspond to thé statutory inter-
prétation approach favoured in Canada. Namely, thé preliminary
requirement of thé utilization of international law through such a
presumption, which is to find that thé statutory provision is ambigu-
ous.ï74 This precondition was considered by Justice Willard Estey in
Schavernochv. Foreign Claims Commission,175 where he explained:
If one could assert an ambiguity, either patent or latent, in thé Régulations
it might be that a court could find support for making référence to matters
external to thé Régulations in order to interpret its terms. Because, how-
ever, there is in my view no ambiguity arising from thé above-quote excerpt
from thèse Régulations, there is no authority and none was drawn to our
attention in argument entitling a court to take recourse either to an under-
lying international agreement or to textbooks on international law with
référence to thé negotiation of agreements or to take recourse to reports
made to thé Government of Canada by persons engaged in thé negotiation
referred to in thé Régulations.176
172
 Danielsv. White and The Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 517^1541 [emphasis added].
173
 Schreiberv. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269, at 293-94. See also,
on thé Schreiberc3.se, S. Beaulac, "Récent Developments on thé Rôle of Interna-
tional Law in Canadian Statutory Interprétation" (2004) 25 Statute L. Rev. 19.
174
 See also thé décision of thé Judicial Committee of thé Privy Council in Collco
Dealingsv. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1962] A.C. i, at 19, where Viscount
Simonds said: "My Lords, thé language that I hâve used is taken from a passage
of p. 148 of thé loth édition of 'Maxwell on thé Interprétation of Statutes'
which ends with thé sentence: 'But if thé statute is unambiguous, its provisions
must be followed even ifthey are contrary to international law.'"
175
 Schavernoch v. Foreign Claims Commission, [1982] i S.C.R. 1092 [hereinafter
Schavernoch].
176
 Ibid., at 1098. See also, to thé same eifect, thé reasons by Chief Justice Boris
Laskin in CapitalCities, supranote 6g, at 173.
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The main problem with such an ambiguity requirement is that
it perpétuâtes thé empty rhetoric of thé plain meaning rule.177
Another concern is how difficult it is to détermine whether or not
thé législation is ambiguous or unambiguous.178 As Lord Oliver of
Aylmerton pointed out in Pepper: "Ingenuity can sometimes suggest
ambiguity or obscurity where none exists in fact."179
The truth of thé matter is that, when judges hold that a statutory
provision is clear or that it is ambiguous, they hâve in fact already
construed thé législation.180 L'Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting in Régie
des permis d'alcool, considered this point and appositely observed
that, "[i]n reality, thé 'plain meaning' can be nothing but thé resuit
of an implicit process of légal interprétation."181 Indeed, rather than
being something a priori, législative ambiguity is a conclusion —
can really be only a conclusion — that is reached at thé end of thé
process of interprétation. Ambiguity is in effect a détermination
that can be made only after a full assessment of thé intention of Par-
liament, using canons and tools of statutory interprétation, includ-
ing international law as a contextual élément.
It is illogical and thus erroneous to require that législation be
ambiguous as a preliminary threshold test to thé interprétation of
législation either in général or specifically with respect to thé use
of international law as an aid to thé construction of statutes. This
was thé conclusion reached by Gonthier J. in National Corn Growers
Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal),182 where he effectively narrowed
down Estey J.'s statement in Schavernochlsz and wrote that "it is
177
 On this point, see S. Beaulac, "Récent Developments at thé Suprême Court of
Canada on thé Use of Parliamentary Debates" (2000) 63 Saskatchewan L. Rev.
581, at 602.
178
 See, generally, C.B. Nutting, "The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes" (1940)
24 Minnesota L. Rev. 509.
179
 Pepper, supra note 149, atÔ2O.
180
 See, on this général issue, Zander, supra note 147, at 121-27; W.N. Eskridge,
Dynamic Statutory Interprétation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1994), at 38-41; NJ. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, vol. 2A, 5th éd.
(New York: Clak Boardman Callaghan, 1992), at 5-6; V. van de Kerchove, L'inter-
prétation en droit — Approche pluridisciplinaire (Brussels: Facultés universitaires
St-Louis, 1978); F.E. Horackjr., "In thé Name of Législative Intention" (1932)
38 West Virginia L.Q. 119, at 121; and M. Radin, "Statutory Interprétation"
(1930) 43 Harvard L. Rev. 863, at 869.
181
 Régie des permis d'alcool, supra note 154, at 997 [emphasis in original].
182
 National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324
[hereinafter National Corn Growers].
183
 Schavernoch, supra note 175, at 1098.
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reasonable to make référence to an international agreement at thé
very outsetofthe inquiry to détermine if there is any ambiguity, even
latent, in thé domestic législation."184 Ruth Sullivan also notes thé
problems with thé reasoning behind thé ambiguity requirement
and agrées that no such preliminary condition is necessary before
resorting to international law.185
The new position that holds that domestic courts in Canada do
not hâve to find an ambiguity or an obscurity in thé statutory pro-
vision before construing it as having a regard to international law
falls squarely within Driedger's modem principle of législative in-
terprétation. This words-in-total-context approach also commands
that thé old way to resort to international law, by invoking thé pre-
sumption of conformity, be reformulated in terms of thé purposive
and contextual method of statutory interprétation. Indeed, inter-
national treaty law ought to be considered in ail cases — not only
when one artificially concludes that there is an ambiguity — as
an élément of context that, as Dickson J. wrote in R. v. Zingre, would
allow for "a fair and libéral interprétation with a view to fulfilling
Canada's international obligations."186
Ruth Sullivan accurately noticed that thé récent trend at thé
Suprême Court of Canada — in décisions such as Baker, Suresh, R. v.
Sharpe,187 and 7/4957 Canada Liée (Spraytech) v. Hudson (Town)lss —
is an increased open "reliance on international law as légal con-
text."189 In this regard, it is interesting to point out that in Baker190
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé relied on an excerpt of thé third édition of
thé Construction ofStatutes, where Sullivan writes:
184
 National Corn Growers, supra note 182, at 1371 [emphasis added]. Similarly, see
M. Hunt, UsingHumanRightsLaw inEnglish Courts (Oxford: Hart, 1997), at 40,
where thé author writes: "So instead of asking if there is ambiguity which can be
resolved with thé 'assistance' of international law, on this approach thé court
should ask, having automatically considered thé international law alongside thé
national law, whether thé domestic law is unambiguously (in thé sens of irrec-
oncilably) in conflict with thé international norms."
185
 See Sullivan, supra no te 15^1437-38.
186
 R. v. Zingre, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392, at4og-io.
187
 Sharpe, supra note 137.
188
 774957 Canada Liée (Spraytech) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 [here-
inafter Spraytech].
189
 Sullivan, supra note 15^1426.
190
 Baker, supra note 2 at 861.
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Second, thé législature is presumed to respect thé values and principles
enshrined in international law, both customary and conventional. Thèse
constitute a part ofthe légal context in which législation is enacted and read. In so
far as possible, therefore, interprétations that reflect thèse values and
principles are preferred.191
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé thus endorsed Sullivan's view on thé rele-
vance of international law as a contextual élément of interprétation. It is
certainly meaningful that her ladyship did not refer to — and thus
did not endorse — what Sullivan writes about thé presumption of
compliance, which is in thé preceding two sentences.192 Therefore,
an argument can be made that Baker stands as an authority for thé
proposition that thé appropriate way to consider international law
is now as an élément of context and not through a presumption of
conformity.193
In Rahamanv. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),194
Justice Kerry P. Evans of thé Fédéral Court of Appeal referred to
Baker and Suresh and opined that "[n]owadays, there is no doubt
that, even when not incorporated by Act of Parliament into Cana-
dian law, international norms are part of thé context within which
domestic statutes are to be interpreted."195 He further wrote, quite
significantly, that, "[o]f course, thé weightto be afforded to inter-
national norms that hâve not been incorporated by statute into
Canadian law will dépend on ail thé circumstances ofthe case."196
There is no reason why thèse remarks do not equally apply to inter-
national law that has been implemented within thé Canadian domes-
tic légal System. Given that such légal norms are authoritative
and persuasive — and not binding — thé national application of
191
 Sullivan, supra note 12, at 330 [emphasis added].
192 This passage, at ibid., reads: "First, thé législature is presumed to comply with
thé obligations owed by Canada as a signatory of international instruments and
more generally as a member of thé international community. In choosing
among possible interprétations, therefore, thé court avoid interprétations that
would put Canada in breach of any of its international obligations. "
193 See S. Beaulac, "L'interprétation de la Charte. Reconsidératiopprochen de l'a
téléologique et réévaluation du rôle du droit international," in G.-A. Beaudoin
and E. Mendes (eds.), The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4th éd.
(Toronto: Carswell, 2004, forthcoming). This is an aspect ofthe Baker case that
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope also noticed, but which they used to argue that
thé majority should hâve resorted to thé old approach ofthe presumption of con-
formity with international law. See Brunnée and Toope, supra note g, at 42-43.
194
 Rahamanv. Canada (Ministerof Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 3 F. C.537.
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 Ibid., at 558 [emphasis added].
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 Ibid. [emphasis added].
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international law should always be considered as a question of
weight, as Evans J. put it.
ANALYTICAL SCHEME OF PERSUASIVE FORCE OF TREATY NORMS
Now that ail thé building blocks hâve been laid down, it is possi-
ble to put forward an analytical scheme to détermine thé persua-
sive force of international law in interpreting statutes. Thèse issues
had to be examined first, however, starting with thé fundamental
proposition that international law in our Westphalian System is not
"binding" within a sovereign state such as Canada, then moving
to thé treaty implementation techniques that ought to inform thé
statutory interprétation framework, which is thé most appropriate
to use in order to address, rationalize, and understand thé national
application of international law. It was also seen that today's légis-
lative interprétation discourse endorses Driedger's modem princi-
ple. Away from thé plain meaning rule or any preliminary threshold
of ambiguity, this approach advocates thé construction of enact-
ments in context — an élément of which is, of course, international
treaty law.
International Treaty Norms as an Elément of Internai Context
The proposed analytical scheme of thé persuasive force of treaty
norms, as an élément of thé contextual interprétation of Canadian
législation, is based on their degree of incorporation within thé
domestic légal System. Simply put, thé clearer it is that thé par-
liamentary authority intended to give effect to international law
through thé transformation of thé convention, thé more weight a
court should recognize and attribute to such norms in thé process
of ascertaining thé meaning of thé statutory provision.197 There is
obviously quite a spectrum of différent levels of domestic incorpo-
ration of international treaties. Based on thé two techniques of
législative implementation examined car lier in this article — incor-
poration by référence and harmonization198 — thé main catégories
of implementation are as follows:
197
 See, however, Brandon, supra note 67, at 443, who wrongly dissociated, on thé
one hand, thé way in which thé parliamentary authority implemented an inter-
national treaty law and, on thé other, thé intention of Parliament in regard to
thé transformation of such norms in thé domestic légal System. She writes: "It is
contended that thé method of implementation is less important than are indi-
cations of an intention to implement. "
198
 See footnotes 97-106 and accompanying text.
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• directly through référence or reproduction of treaty norms in
statute;
• directly by scheduling treaty and intention to thus implement;
• indirectly through thé adoption of a statute based on treaty; and
• indirectly by amending or repealing existing législation.199
In terms of contextual interprétation, thé first two catégories of
incorporated treaty norms form part of thé "internal-immediate-
context" — they are internai in thé sensé that thé statute incorpo-
râtes them within itself, thus embodying and giving direct effect
domestically to such international norms, and they are immédiate
in that they are so intrinsically intertwined with thé législation that
to construe thé domestic légal norms amounts to construing thé
international légal norms.200 This is why, in such situations, courts
must use thé "wording of thé Convention and thé rules of treaty
interprétation,"201 which are found in Articles 31 and 32 of thé
Vienna Convention on thé Law of Treaties,202 as thé majority of
thé Suprême Court of Canada wrote in Pushpanathan v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration). To this extent, thé refore,
Bill Schabas is right to say: "Hence, thé exercise is one of treaty
199
 Thèse catégories borrow, in part, from thé following excerpt in Macdonald,
supra note 96, at 311 : "A treaty may be implemented by législation in one of
three ways: first, Parliament may translate thé treaty into a number of statutes or
amendments to existing statutes; second, it may enact a général law which uses
thé key terms of thé treaty; finally, it may directly enact thé treaty, with an appro-
priate preamble, into English law."
200
 See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 430, where she writes: "Although it becomes part
of domestic législation it retains its identity as an instrument of international
law. It carries its international law baggage with it."
201
 Pushpanathanv. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] i S.C.R.
982, at 1019-20, perBastarache J. [hereinafter Pushpanathan}. See also R. c.
Parisien, [1988] i S.C.R. 950, at 958; Crown Forest Industries Ltd. v. Canada,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 8o2,at827;andR v. Palado(ig8^),fjD.L.E.. (4th) ii2,at 120
(Ontario C.A.). In Thomsonv. Thomson, supranote 102, at 577, La Forest J., for
thé majority, wrote that, except for travaux préparatoire: "By and large, interna-
tional treaties are interpreted in a manner similar to statutes." On this point,
see also Kindred et al., supra note 17, at 202.
202
 Vienna Convention, supra note 54. It is interesting that in Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral) v. Ward, [ 1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, at 713 ff., La Forest J. appears to use thé rules
of treaty interprétation (in particular, those concerning travaux préparatoires),
without mentioning thé Vienna Convention in order to assist in interpreting thé
Immigration Act (supranote 100).
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interprétation and not statutory interprétation,"203 This type of
international law context should hâve thé most persuasive force.204
An illustration of thé first category, which is where there is direct
implementation through thé référence or reproduction of treaty
norms in thé législation, is in Pushpanathan,™ where section 2(1)
of thé Immigration Act206 incorporated by Référence Article iF of
thé Convention Relating to thé Status of Refugees.207 An example
of thé second category, where there is direct implementation
because thé treaty is reproduced in a schedule and there is an in-
tention to thereby incorporate thé conventional norms, is thé situ-
ation in Thomson v. Thomson,208 where Manitoba's Child Custody
Enforcement Act209 had thé Hague Convention of thé Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction210 in a schedule and had an
express provision (section 17) indicating a clear législative inten-
tion to implement thé corresponding international norms.
The last two catégories of incorporated treaty norms form part of
thé "internal-extended-context" — they are also internai in thé sensé
that they hâve direct effect on thé interprétation of thé statute but
they are extended (not immédiate) in that thé parliamentary author-
ity did not accept them as international légal norms but rather
changed them into domestic légal norms through thé process of
transformation. This second group of incorporated treaty law,
unlike thé previous one, is really only domestic in nature and,
although due regard should be given to its international filiation,
such internai législation must be interpreted according to thé
203
 Schabas, supranote 44, at 178. See also, interestingly, Sullivan, supranote 15, at
430-31: "In interpreting an incorporated provision, thé court appropriately
looks to international law materials and to interprétations of thé incorporated
provision by international courts or by courts in other jurisdictions."
204
 Having said that, like any other interprétative argument, a contextual élément
such as international law can never be "determinative" on thé construction of
a statutory provision. Accordingly, thé following statement by Brunnée and
Toope, supra note 9, at 26, appears questionable: "When a treaty has been
explicitly transformed into Canadian law, its provisions should be determinative
in thé interprétation of domestic législation" [emphasis added].
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 Pushpanathan, supra note 201.
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 Immigration Act, supra note 100.
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 Convention Relating to thé Status of Refugees, supra note 101.
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 Thomson, supra note 102.
209
 Child Custody Enforcement Act, S.M. 1982, c. 27 (nowR.S.M. 1987, c. C$6o}.
210
 Hague Convention of thé Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra
note 103.
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principles of statutory interprétation.211 Ruth Sullivan writes that,
for such implementing statutes, "thé court still looks to interna-
tional law materials and interprétations but it considers thé dômes-
tic context as well and in particular it relies on domestic rules and tech-
niques of interprétation."1212 This type of international law context,
nevertheless, has substantial persuasive force.
An illustration of thé third category, where there is indirect
implementation through thé adoption of législation based on thé
intentional convention, is thé situation in W. (V.) v. S. (D.),2lz where
Québec's Act Respecting thé Civil Aspects of International and
Interprovincial Child Abduction214 was based on thé Hague Con-
vention of thé Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction215
and, accordingly, did not intégrale persethe treaty norms. An exam-
ple of thé fourth category, where there is indirect implementation
because of thé amendment or thé repeal of existing législation, is
thé situation in Pfizer,"216 where Part II of thé World Trade Organi-
zation Agreement Implementation Act217 amended and repealed
several statutory provisions of fédéral législation to bring them into
line with Canada's international obligations, but was deemed not
to incorporate thé WTO Agreement,218 which was scheduled in thé
said implementing statute.219
211
 See Schavernoch, supra note 175, at 1098, where EsteyJ. wrote: "Hère thé régu-
lations fall to be interprétée! according to thé maxims of interprétation applica-
ble to Canadian law generally." See also Crown Zellerbach, supra note 119, where
thé Suprême Court of Canada interpreted thé fédéral statute at issue as a domes-
tic pièce of législation, although it was indirectly implementing an international
agreement. See also, at thé Fédéral Court of Canada, R. v. Seaboard Lumber Sales
Co., [1994] 2 F.C. 647 (F.C.T.D.).
212
 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 431 [emphasis added].
213
 W. (V.)v. S. (D.), supra note 105.
214
 Act Respecting thé Civil Aspects of International and Interprovincial Child
Abduction, R.S.Q., c. A-sg.oi.
215
 Hague Convention of thé Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra
note 103.
216
 Pfizer, supranote 109.
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 World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act, supra note 117.
aïs WTO Agreement, supranote 116.
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 See also thé following décision, in similar circumstances and to thé same effect,
by thé Québec Court of Appeal, UL Canada Inc. v. Procureur du Québec, 500-09-
008256-992, i October 2003.
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International Treaty Norms as an Elément ofExternal Context
International norms that do not meet thé implementation re-
quirement examinée! earlier220 are not, strictly speaking, part of
Canadian law; but Pigeon J., dissenting in Capital Cities Communi-
cations Inc. v. Canada (C.R.T.C.), was right in saying that it "is an
over-simplification to say that treaties are of no légal effect unless
implemented by législation."221 Thus, although their potential in-
fluence on thé construction of a statute is greatly reduced — espe-
cially in light of thé séparation of powers, federalist and démocratie
arguments — there are four other catégories of international
treaty norms that must be considered for thé présent purposes.
They are:
• treaty norms that are unimplemented by statute;
• unimplemented treaty norms created after thé adoption of a
statute;
• unratified and even unsigned international treaties; and
• "soft-obligation" treaties (and perhaps other "soft-law" instru-
ments) .
In terms of contextual interprétation, ail of thèse international
norms form part of thé "external context." They are external in thé
sensé suggested by Ruth Sullivan: "The external context of a pro-
vision is thé setting in which thé provision was enacted, its histori-
cal background, and thé setting in which it opérâtes from time to
time."222 She notices that thé Suprême Court of Canada has re-
ferred to thèse éléments as social context, which "encompasses any
facts that are judged to be relevant to thé conception and opération of
législation, whether social, political, économie, cultural, historical
or institutional."223
The international norms of thèse four catégories — and, argu-
ably, international customs and général principles, although thèse
are beyond thé scope of thé présent discussion,224 — are relevant
to thé interprétation and application of statutes even though they
220
 See footnotes 57-72 and 107-35 and accompanying text.
221
 Capital Cities, supra note 6g, at 188.
222
 R. Sullivan, supranote 15, at457-
223
 Ibid. [emphasis added].
224
 As stated at thé outset of thé présent article, no position is taken with regard
to thé domestic rôle of international customary law nor, for that matter, of thé
général principles of international law.
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are no^part of thé laws of Canada.225 Thèse norms were privy to thé
original conception or are relevant to thé contemporary opération
of thé enactment and, to borrowfrom thé .Bafcgrcase,226 thé "values"
they represent and enshrine ought to legitimately inform législative
interprétation. Therefore, unimplemented treaty norms, as well
as unimplemented treaty norms created after thé adoption of thé
statute, form part of thé "external-immediate-context" — they are
immédiate in that, although external to thé statute per se, thé norms
hâve been given some authority, through ratification, by an organ
of government (that is, thé executive branch) as thé expression of
an international consensus. An undeniable degree of persuasive
force should thus be recognized and attributed to such interna-
tional légal norms as a valuable élément of context to thé construc-
tion of statutes.
The first category of treaty norms that are unimplemented by
législation is of course thé situation in thé Baker case, where thé
majority, per L'Heureux-Dubé J., used thé values associated with
thé notion of thé "best interest of thé child" in Article 3(1) of thé
Convention on thé Rights of thé Child,227 which had not been trans-
formed through législation in Canada, as a contextual élément
to interpret thé discretionary power of an immigration officer
granted pursuant to section 114(2) of thé Immigration Act.228 The
second category of unimplemented treaty norms created after thé
adoption of thé législation under scrutiny was also thé situation in
Baker because, to be précise about it, thé Immigration Act229 was
adopted in 1976 while thé Convention on thé Rights of thé Child230
entered into force in 1990 and was actually ratified by Canada in
1992, thus post-dating thé législative provision at issue.
The last two catégories of international norms form part of thé
"external-extended-context" — they are extended as well as external
225
 See footnote 94 and accompanying text.
226
 In Baker, supra note 2 at 861, L'Heureux-Dubé J. famously wrote: "I agrée with
thé respondent and thé Court of Appeal that thé Convention has not been
implemented by Parliament. Its provisions there hâve no direct application
within Canadian law. Nevertheless, thé values reflected in international human
rights law may help inform thé contextual approach to statutory interprétation
and judicial review" [emphasis added].
227
 Convention on thé Rights of thé Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28
I.L.M. 1448, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3 (entered into force on 2 September 1990).
228
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because they represent no more than thé opinion of government
représentatives, or other actors on thé international plane, with
respect to légal norms relevant to thé conception or opération of
thé Canadian statute. In Re Canada Labour Gode™ Justice La Forest
referred to an unratified treaty (thé North Atlantic Treaty Status
of Forces Agreement232) and wrote that "[it] has no légal effect
in Canada, as it has not been ratified by domestic législation, [sic]
Inasmuch as it might influence thé interprétation of thé Act, a con-
trary interprétation is demanded by Article I of thé Leased Bases
Agreement. "233 Ruth Sullivan refers to this excerpt after explaining
that "[t]he body of international conventions, including conven-
tions to which Canada may not be a signatory, forms part of thé
légal context in which législation is draftedand opérâtes."234
In regard to "soft-obligation" treaties,235 Jutta Brunnée and
Stephen Toope agrée that international instruments such as décla-
rations, codes of conduct — and, presumably, unratified and un-
signed treaties — hâve a place as secondary éléments of contextual
interprétation: "There is no reason why Canadian courts should
not draw upon thèse types of norms," they write, "so long as they do
so in a manner that recognizes their non-binding [that is, less
persuasive] quality."236 An illustration of such external-extended-
context is thé situation in Spraytech,237 where L'Heureux-Dubé J.
referred to thé Bergen Ministerial Déclaration on Sustainable
Development in thé ECE Région238 as a non-binding international
instrument to which Canada is a signatory, as évidence of thé
231
 Re Canada Labour Code, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 50.
232
 North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement, Can. T.S. 1953 No. 13.
233
 Re Canada Labour Code, supra note 231.
234
 Sullivan, supra note 12, at 464 [emphasis added].
235
 For a définition of "soft-law," see C.M. Chinkin, "The Challenge of Soft Law:
Development and Change in International Law" (1989) 38 Int'l & Comp. L.Q.
850, at 851 : "Soft law instruments range from treaties, but which include only
soft obligations ('légal soft law'), to non-binding or voluntary resolutions and
codes of conduct formulated and accepted by international and régional organ-
isations ('non-légal soft law'), to statements prepared by individuals in a non-
governmental capacity, but which purport to lay down international principles"
[footnotes omitted].
ase Brunnée and Toope, supra note g, at 62.
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 Spraytech, supranote 188.
ass Bergen Ministerial Déclaration on Sustainable Development in thé ECE
Région, 6 August 1990, Doc. A/CONF. i5i/PC/io, reprintedin (1990) i Y.B.
Int'l Environmental L. 429.
National Application of International Law 267
so-called precautionary principle in international environmental
law, which her ladyship used to confirm thé interprétation given
to a municipal by-law adopted pursuant to section 410(1) of thé
Quebec's Cities and Towns Act.239
CONCLUSION
To recall thé hypothesis that is central to this article, it is argued
that thé national application of international law is, as far as Cana-
dian judges and other domestic actors are concerned, an issue per-
taining to statutory interprétation, which must thus be addressed,
rationalized, and understood within this framework. In order to
prépare thé ground for thé main proposition, thé erroneous claim
that international law "binds" Canada (that is, binds within Canada)
had to be rebutted, having regard to thé général tenets of our inter-
national law System. Then, after considering thé practices followed
by parliamentary authorities to implement international treaties,
Driedger's modem principle was examined in détail, including thé
important rôle of context in ascertaining thé meaning of législa-
tion. Finally, a set of directives was put forward to assist in thé déter-
mination of thé persuasive force of thé international law argument.
The proposed analytical scheme speaks within thé discourse of
statutory interprétation and considers thé matter in which conven-
tions were implemented in Canada and, accordingly, is based on
thé degree of incorporation of treaty norms within thé domestic
légal System. It follows that, ail things being otherwise equal, thé
weight of thé différent types of international law contexts (group-
ing thé eight catégories of treaty norms identified earlier) can be





That being said, thé flexibility of any guidelines meant to help in
thé construction of statutes is crucial in order to allow thé consid-
ération of thé particular circumstances of each enactment and of
each interprétative situation. Therefore, thé hierarchy of thé per-
suasive force of international law as a contextual élément suggested
in this article is by no means absolute.
239
 Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q., c. C-ig, as amended.
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Sommaire
L'application du droit international en droit interne: la perspec-
tive de l'interprétation législative
Bien que l'application du droit international en droit interne ait suscité
beaucoup d'intérêt depuis quelques années, le point de vue national dans le
débat n 'a pas été considéré adéquatement. L'auteur soutient que le recours
au droit international est, pour le juge canadien et les autres intervenants
nationaux, une question d'interprétation des lois qui doit être abordée,
rationalisée et comprise dans cette optique. Tout d'abord, on rappelle la
validité du principe selon lequel les tribunaux canadiens ne sont pas
liés par les normes internationales, y compris celles issues de traité, et ce mal-
gré certains prononcés judiciaires et doctrinaux qui laissent entendre le
contraire. Le droit international ne peut être contraignant puisque notre
modèle "westphalien" de relations internationales, régi par la structure
juridique "vattelienne, "postule l'existence d'un domaine international qui
est distinct et séparé des sphères nationales. De là l'exigence de mettre en
œuvre par voie législative les conventions internationales. Nos tribunaux
interprètent et appliquent le droit canadien; le droit international peut les
influencer dans la mesure où ce droit issu de traité fait partie du droit
interne, mais il ne peut jamais les lier. La seconde partie, et c'est l'apport
principal du texte, présente un modèle d'analyse de la force persuasive du
droit international. A cette fin, il faut examiner la pratique en matière de
mise en œuvre de traité et comment elle est liée à l'intention du parlement —
indiquant l'impossibilité de l'incorporation passive. Il faut aussi tenir
compte de la méthode moderne d'interprétation des lois de Driedger, qui
favorise le recours au droit international comme élément contextuel dans
tous les cas plutôt que comme présomption de conformité liée à l'exigence
préliminaire, et artificielle, d'ambiguïté. En bout d'analyse, il est démontré
que le poids de l'argument de droit international dépendra du degré d'incor-
poration des normes conventionnelles dans le système juridique canadien.
A cet égard, il y aurait quatre types de contexte dans lesquels tomberaient les
catégories de normes issues de traité. Dans l'ordre décroissant de leur
autorité persuasive: (a) le contexte interne immédiat, (b) le contexte interne
élargi, (c) le contexte externe immédiat et (d) le contexte externe élargi.
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Summary
National Application of International Law: The Statutory Interpré-
tation Perspective
In récent years, although thé national application of international law has
gathered much interest, thé domestic point ofview on thé issue has not been
adequately considered. The argument defended in this article is that thé
domestic use of international law is, as far as Canadian judges and other
domestic actors are concernée, a question ofstatutory interprétation, which
must be addressed, rationalized, and understood within this framework.
First, thé author refers to theprinciple according to which Canadian courts
are not bound by international norms, including treaty norms, which is still
valid even though somejudicial and doctrinal statements seem to challenge
it. International law cannot be binding upon national courts because thé
"Westphalian " model of international relations, regulated by thé "Vat-
telian " légal structure, postulâtes thé existence of an international plane
that is distinct and separatefrom thé internai sphères. Hence, thé require-
ment that international conventions be implemented through thé adoption
of domestic législation. Our courts interpret and apply Canadian law and,
to thé extent that international treaty law is part of domestic law, it may
hâve an influence on them, but without ever binding them. The second
part, and thé main contribution of thé article, consists of an analytical
scheme of thé persuasive force of international law. The practices of treaty
implementation and how it relates to parliamentary intent — showing also
that passive incorporation is impossible — as well as Driedger's modem
approach to statutory interprétation, which favours recourse to interna-
tional law as a contextual élément in ail cases over a presumption of con-
formity involving thé preliminary and artificial requirement of ambiguity
are discussed in thé article. In thé final analysis, it is shown that thé weight
ofthe international law argument shall be based on thé degree of incorpora-
tion of treaty norms within thé Canadian légal System. In this regard, there
would befour types ofcontext in which fall thé catégories of treaty norms. In
decreasing order of persuasive authority: (i) infernal-immédiate context;
(2) internal-extended context; (3) external-immediate context; and (4)
external-extended context.
